CFR advocates Military Takeover in Egypt
As usual, the sacred cow of "democracy" is only desirable when it serves US and israeli interests.
Of course, I'm not surprised.
But, it is a bit odd that these people can consistently advocate political meddling and bloody military takeovers around the globe, one country at a time - openly and with impunity.
The following passages are a few highlights...
The whole document is worth reading: it gives US policymakers a step-by-step blueprint for how to interfere in Egyptian politics and socio-economic engineering -- up to and including fomenting a military takeover-- so as to elicit the best outcome for US and israeli corporate interests.
It is entirely possible that Egyptians—like the millions of Iranians who turned out into the streets to protest rigged elections in June 2009—would rally around a charismatic figure armed with an attractive alternative vision of society. Under these circumstances, it is not at all clear that Egypt’s commanders—despite their commitment to social cohesion and the present political order—or their conscripts would have the fortitude to kill large numbers of demonstrators.
* * *
It is important to note that unlike a military intervention, which the United States could accept and even come to like, an Islamist takeover in Egypt would have a catastrophic affect on U.S. interests in the Middle East. The Islamists oppose almost every facet of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Any instability triggered by an Islamist push would in all likelihood greatly restrict the regime’s ability to cooperate with the United States. Should Islamists topple the regime, the reverberations would be felt throughout the region. The United States might lose access to the Suez Canal, Egypt’s new leadership might abrogate the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and Islamists in other Arab countries allied with the United States would be emboldened, jeopardizing the stability of those places.
* * *
Should U.S. efforts fail to reduce the likelihood of an Islamist push for power and the instability that would likely follow, Washington will have two options for managing the crisis. First, Washington can advise the senior officers of the Egyptian armed forces to take matters into their own hands to prevent an Islamist takeover. The result as noted above would likely be bloody, but the military’s intervention would preserve a regime that has been critical to U.S. interests in the Middle East. American policymakers should be aware, however, that the military’s actions may not buy Egypt much longterm stability as it risks a public backlash and radicalization of Egyptian politics that would portend the reemergence of extremist groups targeting the state and possibly its primary patron, the United States.
Second, the United States should work with Egypt’s armed forces and internal security services to prevent bloodshed and further instability. The investment in outreach through the IMET program and military-to-military exchange is critical to mitigating instability. These programs often provide an important reservoir of goodwill between American officials/officers and their foreign counterparts.
In the event of acute instability in Egypt, these relationships will be critical channels of communication through which Washington can provide advice to the Egyptians and offer assistance in deescalating the situation and preventing more bloodshed.
In the event that Islamists come to power in Egypt, the United States will need to shore up its alliances with other Arab states. Washington will also need to walk the fine line between a policy of coercion to ensure that Egypt does not threaten U.S. interests further and a policy of engagement to mitigate the consequences of what will surely be a confrontational relationship.
* * *
Military intervention in Egypt poses some short-terms risks to the United States. In contrast, a successful Islamist push for power in Egypt would result in a fundamental shift in the regional order that would pose a far greater threat—in magnitude and degree—to U.S. interests than the Iranian revolution.
And they bother to ask 'why people hate us.'